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"Adversaries" might well have been a better word. It would have car-
ried less of a connotation of mutual animosity than "antagonists"-the
key word in the title of the recent book, The Antagonists: Hugo Black,
Felix Frankfurter and Civil Liberties in Modern America, by James F.
Simon, Dean of New York Law School.1 To be sure, "antagonists" seems
to be a time-honored catchword for the relationship between the two great
Justices whose competing philosophies shaped the development of Ameri-
can constitutional law for over two decades-from the late 1930's to the
early 1960's. Max Freedman wrote in 1967 that "Black and Frankfurter
have often been put in opposition to one another as antagonists on the
Supreme Court." But Freedman went on to make clear that this popular
conception was in some sense a misconception, leaving out the "actual
fact, that their judicial differences never hampered their mutual respect
and long friendship."2 And this "actual fact" is one of the very gratify-
ing-indeed, very moving-themes (albeit a secondary one) of Dean Si-
mon's insightful book.
The major themes canvassed by Simon are the large issues which domi-
nated the Court's agenda in the Black-Frankfurter years, most of which
are with us still: the scope of the First Amendment's speech and religion
guaranties; the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment; the impact of national security, as perceived by the executive
and legislative branches, on the readiness of the judicial branch to protect
individual liberty; the capacity of courts to overturn race-defined barriers
to equality before the law; modes of accommodating judicial avoidance of
* Dean, New York Law School.
t United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
1. J. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
MODERN AMERICA (1989) [hereinafter by page only].
2. I. FREEDMAN, ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at
458 (1967).
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''political questions" with judicial protection of a citizen's entitlement to
participate in the electoral process on a free and equal basis. On most of
these issues the two Justices disagreed. On one-race-they agreed.
Presumably for the reason that Simon intended his work for popular
consumption, he has not attempted the elaborate doctrinal analysis that,
quite properly, characterizes most of the extensive literature on the two
Justices. Simon's book offers far less grist for the mill of constitutional
theory than, for example, Professor Wallace Mendelson's Justices Black
and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court,3 published almost thirty years
ago. On the other hand, Simon is markedly successful in portraying the
two Justices as flesh-and-blood people, and in placing them in the context
of the social and political forces that brought them to prominence, led
them to the Court, and gave texture, nuance and vitality to the cases, great
and small, which were their common intellectual fare for so many years.
Thus, the first third of Simon's book consists of two profiles which bring
the remarkable-and wholly dissimilar-pre-Court careers of the two
protagonists to the fore.
"Felix" is a vivid retelling of the relatively familiar story of the immi-
grant boy who succeeded impressively at City College and Harvard Law
School; who, as a young government lawyer, was apprenticed to Henry
Stimson in New York and Washington; who became a protegE of Bran-
deis; who returned to Harvard as a professor, only to take leave during
World War I for further public service; who, while back in Washington,
became friendly with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D.
Roosevelt; who, again ensconced in Cambridge, continued to immerse
himself in public issues, most notably the Sacco-Venzetti case, in ways
calculated to outrage the Harvard establishment; and who, during the
New Deal, was an academic eminence grise and endless supplier of talent
for his old friend, the President of the United States.-
"Hugo" is an equally compelling and less familiar story of the Ala-
bama boy who grew up in Ashland (population 350), the county seat of
Clay County, where his father ran the general store; who was pushed by
his mother to study medicine, but forsook medicine for law; who, in 1915,
as a young county prosecutor, sparked a grand jury investigation of appal-
ling police third-degree methods, mostly directed at blacks; who soon be-
came one of Alabama's most successful personal injury lawyers, earning
over $40,000 in 1925; who joined the Ku Klux Klan in 1923, was elected
to the Senate with Klan support in 1926, and then resigned from the
3. W. MENDELSON, JusTIcEs BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1966).
The first edition of Mendelson's book appeared in 1961, a year before Justice Frankfurter retired; the
second edition appeared in 1966, a year after the Justice's death. Mendelson's doctrinal discussion
swept more broadly than Simon's does. Not limiting himself to civil liberties issues, Mendelson ex-
amined the Justices' contrasting positions on federalism and on separation of powers as well.
4. Pp. 21-65.
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Klan; who was reelected in 1932 and soon became one of the new Presi-
dent's legislative stalwarts, even going down the line for Roosevelt in sup-
port of the Court-packing plan.5
I. APPOINTMENTS TO THE COURT
In February of 1937, Franklin Roosevelt, flushed with his landslide
reelection and smarting from the Court's repeated rebuffs to key elements
of his New Deal program, unveiled his ill-conceived and ill-fated Court-
packing plan-a plan which Senator Black embraced and Professor
Frankfurter neither disavowed nor championed. Within a matter of
weeks, the judicial ground had markedly shifted-West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish' and NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin7 seemed to signal new depar-
tures. And by the end of the Court's term Justice Van Devanter had re-
tired, reducing the Four (judicial) Horsemen to three. With his first op-
portunity to make a Supreme Court appointment, Roosevelt appeared to
be on the brink of achieving by attrition the new Court that he was still
pressing Congress to manufacture by adding Justices. Roosevelt an-
nounced that he would nominate Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas
to Van Devanter's seat; but in July the aging majority leader suddenly
died, and the Court-packing plan died as well.8 On August 11, Roosevelt
asked the senior Senator from Alabama to visit him at the White House,
and the two reportedly had the following exchange:
"Hugo, this is a form for the nomination of a Supreme Court Jus-
tice. May I fill in your name?" Black replied, "Mr. President, are
you sure that I'll be more useful in the Court than in the Senate?"
"Hugo, I wish you were twins because [Alben] Barkley says he
needs you in the Senate; but I think you'll be more useful on the
Court."9
Frankfurter was one of those who strongly applauded the President's
5. Pp. 66-100. The "Hugo" profile is of particular value becase no one has yet produced a full-
scale biography of Justice Black. To be sure, there are touching and insightful family memoirs. See
the book by Hugo Black, Jr., My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE (1973), and the book by Elizabeth De
Meritte Black, the Justice's second wife, and Hugo Black, Jr., MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE
MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK (1986). See also the many references to the
Justice and his first wife, Josephine Black, in the autobiography of Virginia Foster Durr, Josephine
Black's sister, OUTSIDE THE MAGIC CIRCLE (1985).
The one biographical treatment of Frankfurter, Michael E. Parrish's FELIX FRANKFURTER AND
HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS (1982), is a valuable and comprehensive study of Frankfurter's life
up to his appointment to the Court; Parrish's further volume on the Court years will complete the
biography.
6. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
7. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
8. Schlesinger, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1605, 1607 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
9. Frank, Hugo L. Black, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2321, 2322 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1986).
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choice. Confirmation swiftly followed. But before Black took his seat on
the Court in the fall of 1937, he had to contend with a fire-storm that
greeted disclosure in the national press of his decade-earlier, politically
expedient, and brief membership in the Klan. Black, a skilled orator, con-
fronted the dragon of the past in a radio address. The President judged
the address " 'a grand job,' . . . . 'It did the trick. You just wait and
see.' "10 Roosevelt's political judgment-which had gone awry with the
Court-packing plan-was once again on target.
In January of 1938, three months after Black took his seat, Justice
Sutherland retired. To that vacancy Roosevelt appointed his Solicitor
General, Stanley Reed. In the summer of 1938, Justice Cardozo died. In
conversation a few weeks later, the President told his friend Frankfurter
that he could not appoint him to the Court; politics required appointment
of somebody from west of the Mississippi, and he asked Frankfurter's
advice about a number of possible candidates. Months passed with no
nomination. Then-as Frankfurter was later to recall-on the evening of
January 4, 1939, the following took place:
While I was dressing, while I was in my B.V.D.'s, the door bell
rang at 192 Brattle Street, and my wife was going down. We had a
guest for dinner, Professor Robert Morse Lovett of the University of
Chicago who is a very, very punctual man. It was seven o'clock. My
wife all dressed was going down, and here I was in my B.V.D.'s.
She said, "Please hurry! You're always late." Just then while I had
this conjugal injunction the telephone rang. I went to the telephone.
My study was right across the hall, opposite our bed room. The
telephone rang, and there was the ebullient, the exuberant, resilient
warmth-enveloping voice of the President of the United States,
"Hello. How are you?" "I'm fine. How are you?" "How's
Marion?" "Fine." "You know, I told you I don't want to appoint
you to the Supreme Court of the United States." I said, "Yes." I no
more expected the denouement of this conversation. You know, he
was given to teasing. Some people said that it was an innocently
sadistic streak in him. He just had to have an outlet for fun. "I told
you I can't appoint you to the Supreme Court." "Yes, you told me
that." "I mean this. I mean this. I don't want to appoint you to the
Supreme Court." Here I was in my B.V.D.'s, and I knew Marion
would be as sore as she could be. She had said I'm always late which
is indeed substantially true. "I mean it. I don't want to appoint you.
I just don't want to appoint you."
I said, "Yes, you told me that. You've made that perfectly clear. I
understand that."
I was getting bored, really, when he whipped around on the tele-
phone and said, "But unless you give me an unsurmountable objec-
tion I'm going to send your name in for the Court tomorrow at
10. P. 98 (quoting J. FARLEY, JIM FARLEY'S STORY 108 (1948)).
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twelve o'clock"-just like that, and I remember saying, and it is nat-
ural to remember this very vividly-"All I can say is that I wish my
mother were alive."11
According to Michael Parrish, we are not to take Frankfurter's recol-
lection of the January 4, 1939 episode at face value: "This image of
Frankfurter, clad only in undershorts, struck dumb by Roosevelt's change
of heart, has a certain romantic appeal-but it's wholly false."' 2 Parrish
goes on to say:
Joe Rauh, Jr., then one of Corcoran's assistants and later a Frank-
furter law clerk, recalls a different version of events in December
and January. Tommy the Cork kept the phone lines busy between
Washington and Cambridge each evening, bringing his mentor up to
date on the shifting battle scene. Corcoran and his supporters kept
friendly senators supplied with damaging information about other
potential candidates, and they organized an impressive letter-writing
campaign on Frankfurter's behalf. Wavering senators, for instance,
found their mailboxes stuffed with pro-Frankfurter wires from
Harvard Law School alumni, old progressives, law professors, and
leaders of local bar associations.
In addition to gaining the endorsement of Senator Norris, a key
Westerner, the Corcoran forces received important support for
Frankfurter from Hopkins, Robert Jackson, the new solicitor gen-
eral, and Ickes, all of whom argued that Roosevelt might forever lose
the opportunity to put his friend on the Court unless he did it now.
"If you appoint Felix," Ickes told F.D.R., "his abilities and learning
are such that he will dominate the Supreme Court for fifteen or
twenty years to come. The result will be that probably after you are
dead, it will still be your Supreme Court." Only Frankfurter, argued
Jackson, had the legal resources "to face Chief Justice Hughes in
conference and hold his own in discussion," a point reinforced by
Justice Stone, who also urged F.D.R. to name Frankfurter, because
he could help contain the wily chief justice. 13
Soon after Frankfurter took his seat, Roosevelt made a fourth appoint-
ment: William 0. Douglas, SEC Chairman and erstwhile Yale pi'ofessor,
to replace Justice Brandeis, who had retired.
And for a while it appeared that Black and Frankfurter would be joint
leaders of a new nucleus of Justices-not yet a majority, but likely to
become one. Notably, and expectably, they were apostles of judicial
restraint.
In Coleman v. Miller,' members of the Kansas Legislature sued in the
11. F. FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 282-83 (H. Phillips ed. 1960).
12. N1. PARRISH, supra note 5, at 275.
13. Id. at 275-76 (footnotes omitted).
14. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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Kansas Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing various state
officials not to certify to the Governor the 1937 ratification by the legisla-
ture of the Child Labor Amendment that Congress had submitted to the
states in 1924. Plaintiffs contended that (1) a prior rejection of the amend-
ment by the Kansas Legislature precluded later ratification; (2) the Lieu-
tenant Governor, who had voted to break a Senate tie, was not a proper
participant in the ratifying process contemplated by the Constitution; and
(3) the amendment, proposed in 1924, had in any event long since lost all
constitutional vitality. The Kansas Supreme Court entertained the appli-
cation and denied it on its merits. The Supreme Court, on certiorari, af-
firmed by a vote of seven (Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, Rob-
erts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, and Douglas) to two (Justices Butler and
McReynolds). The opinion of the Court was written by Chief Justice
Hughes, and was joined by Justices Stone and Reed. The opinion de-
clared that (1) those plaintiffs-petitioners-legislators who had voted
against ratification had standing to sue, (2) whether the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor's participation was a "political question" committed to Congress
rather than the courts was a matter on which the Court was equally di-
vided, and (3) the other claims made were "political questions." Justice
Black filed a concurrence, for himself and Justices Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas, challenging any intimation in the Chief Justice's opinion
that any aspect of the ratification process was judicially reviewable. And
Justice Frankfurter filed a separate opinion, for the same four Justices,
taking issue with the holding that any of the plaintiffs-petitioners-legisla-
tors had standing to sue.'5
In a very different context, Justice Frankfurter, in 1941, filed a dissent
that sounded other notes of judicial caution for himself and Justices Black,
Douglas, and Murphy. The case was Sibbach v. Wilson, 16 and the issue
was the validity of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, authorizing court
orders for the physical examination of a party to civil litigation. Frank-
furter saw such an exercise of judicial authority as a substantial intrusion
upon personal autonomy-and it was a form of authority that, prior to
the Rules, the Federal courts concededly did not possess. Frankfurter did
not doubt that Congress had power to vest Federal courts with such au-
thority, but he was unpersuaded that such a significant departure from
prior practice could be squared with the directive of the Rules Enabling
Act that "[s]aid rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the sub-
15. Justice Butler, writing for himself and Justice McReynolds, concluded that the proposed
amendment, thirteen years old, was no longer viable. What remains a mystery is how the Court could
have been equally divided on the "political question" status of the Lieutenant Governor's participa-
tion, given that four of the nine Justices had announced that all petitioners' claims were political
questions; for the Court to be equally divided, one of the other five would have had to abstain with
respect to the Lieutenant Governor issue, but no such abstention is noted in either the Hughes or the
Butler opinion.
6. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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stantive rights of any litigant.""7 And Frankfurter rejected the Court's
view that, since the Rules were laid before Congress before taking effect,
the fact that "no adverse action was taken by Congress indicates . . . that
no transgression of legislative policy was found.""i In the view of the dis-
senters, "[h]aving due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the prac-
tical conditions surrounding the business of Congress when the Rules
were submitted, to draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action
by Congress is to appeal to unreality."19
The dissenting unity evidenced in these cases translated into a strong
majority in the first major civil liberties case to reach the Court after
Frankfurter's appointment. The case was Gobitis,20 in which Frankfurter,
writing for every member of the Court but Stone, sustained a compulsory
public school flag salute challenged by Jehovah's Witness children as re-
quiring of them the sacrilege of obeisance to a symbol which was not
divine. Douglas signed on to the opinion with this encomium: "'The
Court is indebted to you.' . . . 'This is a powerful moving document of
incalculable contemporary and (I believe) historic value. I congratulate
you on a truly statesmanlike job.' "21 But outside the Court the response
was chilly, especially in those quarters of liberal opinion which had for so
many years looked to Professor Frankfurter for leadership. And, as Simon
tells us, the unity within the Court quickly eroded. Later in 1940, Doug-
las revisited the Gobitis problem in a conversation with Frankfurter that
the latter memorialized in his scrapbook:
"Hugo thinks maybe we made a mistake in Gobitis."
"Has Hugo been reading the Constitution?"
"No, he's been reading the newspapers . "..."22
Two years later, Black, Douglas, and Murphy filed a dissent in an-
other Jehovah's Witness case announcing their revisionist view that Gobi-
tis was wrongly decided. And, with the appointment to the Court of two
new Justices-Jackson and Rutledge-the stage was set for the overruling
of Gobitis. The vehicle was West Virginia Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,23 decided on Flag Day, 1943, in the midst of World War II. Jack-
son wrote the Court's opinion. Only Roberts and Reed stayed with
Frankfurter. The depth of Frankfurter's distress can be gauged by the
opening paragraph of his celebrated dissent. According to Max Freedman,
17. Federal Rules Enabling Acts, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1982)).
18. 312 U.S. at 16.
19. Id. at 18.
20. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
21. P. 111 (quoting from Felix Frankfurter papers, Harvard Law School).
22. P. 115 (quoting from H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 152 (1981)).
23. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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two members of the Supreme Court, who need not be identified here,
called formally on Frankfurter in his Chambers to plead with him to
omit or soften this opening paragraph. They said it was too emo-
tional and too personal for inclusion in a Supreme Court opinion.
Frankfurter said they had given him very good reasons for taking
these words out, but he had even better reasons for keeping them in
24
The paragraph follows:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in his-
tory is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our
Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should
wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in
the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thought and action
of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither
Catholic nor agnostic. We owe equal attachment to the Constitution
and are equally bound by our judicial obligations whether we derive
our citizenship from the earliest or the latest immigrants to these
shores. As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my
private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply
I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.
The duty of a judge who must decide which of two claims before the
Court shall prevail, that of a State to enact and enforce laws within
its general competence or that of an individual to refuse obedience
because of the demands of his conscience, is not that of the ordinary
person. It can never be emphasized too much that one's own opinion
about the wisdom or evil of a law should be excluded altogether
when one is doing one's duty on the bench. The only opinion of our
own even looking in that direction that is material is our opinion
whether legislators could in reason have enacted such a law. In the
light of all the circumstances, including the history of this question
in this Court, it would require more daring than I possess to deny
that reasonable legislators could have taken the action which is
before us for review. Most unwillingly, therefore, I must differ from
my brethren with regard to legislation like this. I cannot bring my
mind to believe that the "liberty" secured by the Due Process Clause
gives this Court authority to deny to the State of West Virginia the
attainment of that which we all recognize as a legitimate legislative
end, namely, the promotion of good citizenship, by employment of
the means here chosen.25
By the time Barnette was decided, Black's change of mind signified
more than a disagreement with Frankfurter over one highly controversial
24. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 701. According to Simon, at p. 118, Frankfurter's law clerk,
Philip Elman, made the same point to the Justice, but also to no avail.
25. 319 U.S. at 646-47. For a reprise of Gobitis, Barnette, and related matters, see Pollak, The
Republic for Which It Stands, 24 LAND & WATER L. REv. 565 (1989).
2098 [Vol. 99: 2091
Frankfurter & Black
issue. It signified a rejection of Frankfurter's leadership. And it further
signified the beginning of Black's assumption of leadership of a voting
bloc that included Douglas, Murphy, and, frequently but not uniformly,
Rutledge. Happily, notwithstanding that the once-cordial Frankfurter-
Douglas relationship steadily deteriorated, Frankfurter and Black always
remained friends. There were occasional strains, for Frankfurter was not
above saying callous things about Black to third persons. But in its essen-
tials the friendship endured, and indeed was to grow stronger-in consid-
erable measure because the Frankfurters were devoted to Josephine Black
(the Justice's first wife, who died in 1951)26 and to the Blacks' three
children.
II. THE INTELLECTUAL DEBATE
Simon's book is basically a narrative of the intellectual and institutional
discord, and the personal concord, of Black and Frankfurter. To retell
that narrative here would serve no useful purpose. But certain observa-
tions on a few of the highlights may be in order.
A. Incorporation
The Black-Frankfurter debate that glowed with most intensity was the
question whether the protections of the Federal Bill of Rights are incorpo-
rated, as against the states, into the Fourteenth Amendment. Before
Frankfurter came to the Court, Black, the junior Justice, had joined Car-
dozo's last great opinion, Palko v. Connecticut.2" Palko rejected appel-
lant's claim that, via the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's
ban on double jeopardy invalidated a Connecticut statute under which the
state, after successfully appealing errors committed at a trial which re-
sulted in a second degree murder conviction and a life sentence, had tried
appellant again, this time getting a first degree murder conviction and a
death sentence. Cardozo rejected any "general rule" of absorption of all of
the enumerated rights of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. He catalogued those Federal rights that the
Court had held were not binding on the states-for instance, the grand
jury-and compared them with those that were-such as "freedom of
thought, and speech, . . . the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom," and "the thought that condemnation
shall be rendered only after a real [hearing], not a sham or a pretense."28
And from this comparison Cardozo distilled, as an organizing principle,
26. Six years later, Justice Black married Elizabeth DeMeritte. For her touching reminiscences,
see E. BLACK, supra note 5.
27. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
28. Id. at 326-27 (citations omitted).
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the question whether a particular right was "of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty.""9
Six years later, in Adamson v. California,"0 Black in dissent repudiated
Palko. In order to demonstrate that the defendant's California murder
conviction was vitiated by the prosecutor's comments on his failure to take
the stand, Black argued that the California rule contravened the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, and that the privilege,
and all other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, were intended by the
Congress which framed the Fourteenth Amendment to be applicable to
the states. Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, joined issue with Black,
and legal historians have since been examining the issue, with not-quite
pellucid clarity."1
Revisiting the debate over forty years later, one is struck by the wisdom
of observations ventured by Paul Freund just two years after Adamson:
The whole episode of the debate on the general meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment is unfortunate. The controversy magnifies
differences and obscures agreements . . . . Moreover, as a contro-
versy over the meaning of history the debate on the Fourteenth
Amendment can hardly be resolved. Whatever the general language
of the sponsors of the Amendment, they did not squarely address
themselves to the question whether each and every enumerated right
in the first eight amendments was carried into the Fourteenth; and
much less can we find an answer in the views of the legislators who
ratified in the states.
3 2
And Professor Freund's more general comments-comments not tied just
to Palko-Adamson-also deserve our respectful attention:
How can the professional, or indeed the lay, observer of the Court's
work better understand the concord and discord that he finds? He
can recognize that because of the Court's special position in relation
to our political as well as social institutions, it perforce operates in
more than one realm of values; and that to assess those values re-
quires judicial art, not artfulness, He can strive to understand the
pressures of advocacy and of personal preference and the defensive
mechanism which these evoke in the judicial mind. He can endeavor
to appreciate the complexities of judging before criticizing the sim-
plicities of voting. He can refrain from assigning judges to appointed
places in a heavenly choir, to tiers in a celestial hierarchy. By doing
these things we can perhaps give point to the story of the Irish cleric
29. Id. at 325.
30. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
31. Compare, e.g., Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) with Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legisla-
tive History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm. L. REa. 1 (1954).
32. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 33-34 (1949).
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who was asked by a parishioner what the difference was between the
cherubim and seraphim, and who answered, "I think that there was
once a difference between them, but they have made it up."33
The message of the Irish cleric should be heeded, but it should not be
permitted to obscure what Black, at least, felt was crucially at issue in
Adamson. Black felt that to permit judges-even judges as perceptive as
Cardozo, or Frankfurter, or himself-to construct constitutional norms on
the basis of their perceptions of what constitutes "the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty" was to give those non-elected, and hence non-
accountable, officials boundless license to define the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment as broadly or narrowly as they chose. Black may have
been wrong in thinking that his Adamson formula would improve any-
thing.3 4 But the problem of how to set limits on judicial ad hocness, with-
out surrendering to a formulaic and undifferentiating per seness, remains
a besetting one. Indeed, at the level of Supreme Court adjudication the
problem may be more intractable today than it was when Black and
Frankfurter wrestled with it. Since the Court currently considers on the
merits so minuscule a fraction-far less than one percent-of the cases
decided by the circuit courts of appeal, the Palko paradigm of case-by-case
refinement of a constitutional principle is markedly harder to achieve. As
Justice Scalia recently pointed out, "[t]he idyllic notion of 'the court' grad-
ually closing in on a fully articulated rule of law by deciding one discrete
fact situation after another . . . simply cannot be applied to a court that
will revisit the area in question with great infrequency.""
B. Points of Agreement
Black and Frankfurter were in agreement on the two most important
cases to come before the Court during their joint tenure. In both instances
the fact of their agreement had a decisive impact on shaping the Court's
decision.
1. Korematsu v. United States
The first case was Korematsu v. United States.36 The Court there sus-
tained, by a vote of six to three, the World War II program for the reloca-
tion of Japanese-Americans residing on the west coast. Under the pro-
gram, senior military commanders, operating pursuant to the loosest of
33. Id. at 42-43.
34. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criti-
cism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 338-39 (1957).
35. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CMH. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (1989).
36. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). A year before Koreinatsu,
the Court had sustained a far less draconian directive-namely, a curfew for west coast Japanese
Americans. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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Congressional authorizations, promulgated orders requiring United States
citizens, and permanent resident aliens, of Japanese ancestry to leave their
west coast homes and report to assembly centers, whence approximately
120,000 of them were shipped inland to internment centers. Failure to
comply with the military orders was a crime. The Court majority con-
sisted of Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter,
Douglas, and Rutledge. The dissenters-each of whom filed an opin-
ion-were Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson. Stone asked Black
(apart from Stone, the senior member of the majority) to write the Court's
opinion. Black's opinion undertook to treat the case as if the only aspect of
the relocation program at issue was the exclusion order, that is, the re-
quirement, which Fred Korematsu concededly violated, that he leave his
home in San Leandro, California. The further requirement that Kore-
matsu, on departing from San Leandro, report to an assembly center, with
the probability of then being shipped to an internment camp, was beyond
the Court's judicial vision. Black's opinion was, as Simon observes, "the
worst judicial opinion that Justice Hugo Black wrote in his thirty-four
years on the Court.""1 Frankfurter's concurring opinion was better only
in the sense that it was shorter.
Koreinatsu is almost as completely discredited as Dred Scott. s Four
decades later, on a showing that the Government brief in the Supreme
Court misrepresented the facts said to establish the military necessity for
the challenged orders, the convictions of Fred Korematsu and others were
set aside.39 And in the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which authorized mod-
est reparations for those interned, Congress acknowledged that a
grave injustice was done to both citizens and permanent resident
aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and intern-
ment of civilians during World War II. . . .[T]hese actions were
carried out without adequate security reasons . . . and were moti-
vated largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of
political leadership. . . . For these fundamental violations of the ba-
sic civil liberties and constitutional rights of these individuals of Jap-
anese ancestry, the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation."'
The six members of the Korematsu majority cannot be criticized for not
intuiting in 1944 what was to remain hidden from courts and Congress
alike for forty years. But the six Justices may properly be criticized for
not being as sensitive to the manifestly grave constitutional issues
37. P. 155; see Rostow, TheJapanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
38. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
39. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp 1406 (N.D. Cal 1984). The misrepresentation was
not known to Government counsel, who evidently relied in good faith on the misinformation fed to
them. See Karst, Japanese American Cases, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 8, at 1010, 1012; P.
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
40. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
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presented to the Court as were their three dissenting colleagues. It may be
surmised that the myopia of Black and Frankfurter was compounded by
the strong personal loyalty that each had for the President/Commander-
in-Chief. But it is noteworthy that two of the three dissenters-Murphy
and Jackson-had served Roosevelt as Attorney General, and the
third-Roberts-had, at Roosevelt's request, conducted an inquiry into
the unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor; none of the three was likely to be
indifferent to the legitimate demands of national security in wartime.
With Korematsu one may compare The Steel Seizure Case,4" decided
eight years later. There, the Court considered executive action-the
seizure of most of the nation's steel plants-taken by Secretary of Com-
merce Sawyer at the direction of President Truman. The Secretary acted
to avoid a threatened work stoppage that would have jeopardized steel
production required for the Korean War. The principal question was
whether the seizure of the steel plants was authorized by statute. The case
was decided by a vote of six to three-the same margin as that in Kore-
matsu. But this time the decision went against the President/Commander-
in-Chief. The Court's opinion was written by Black. Frankfurter wrote a
concurrence, 42 as did Jackson.
2. Brown v. Board of Education
The second case was Brown v. Board of Education.43 Simon relates in
capsule form much of the inside-the-Court history first narrated in metic-
ulous detail by Richard Kluger,"4 and recently given a revisionist spin by
Philip Elman." Quite properly we give major credit for the Court's
unanimous decisions, both as to liability and as to remedy, to Earl War-
ren, whom President Eisenhower appointed to the Chief Justiceship, in
succession to Fred Vinson, in 1953. If Vinson had not died, or if Eisen-
hower had not appointed a Chief Justice with the stature and strong
moral purpose of Warren, the Court would almost surely have been badly
divided in Brown. But even Warren could not have rounded up the votes
and fashioned the opinions single-handedly. The strong support of Black
and Frankfurter was essential.
Black-the former Klansman, and the only Justice from the Deep
South-knew where his judicial duty lay long before Brown I was de-
cided. He said as much to his eldest son, Hugo Black, Jr., a rising Bir-
mingham lawyer who was thinking of running for Congress. Justice
41. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
42. If Frankfurter's ties to Truman were weaker than those to Roosevelt, his ties to Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, Truman's principal adviser in the Korean War, were not.
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1).
44. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
45. Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 100
HARV. L. REv. 817 (1987). But cf. Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1938
(1987). Elman was Frankfurter's law clerk in the early 1940's. See supra note 24.
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Black told young Hugo that cases on the Court's docket might be decided
in a way that would complicate his political future:
"I've got to tell you something in strictest confidence that has a lot
to do with your decision." "What's that, Daddy?" "We've got some
cases up before us where they are challenging segregation of the
races. I agree with old Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Fergu-
son. I don't believe segregation is constitutional." "I think you are
right, Daddy."
'46
For Frankfurter-an early adviser to the NAACP, and mentor of both
Charles H. Houston and William H. Hastie-the answer was just as
clear. As Frankfurter clerk William T. Coleman, Jr., has written,
"Frankfurter's commitment to racial equality was absolute."4 So the Jus-
tice, even before Vinson's death, had begun the missionary work that
would narrow differences and, ultimately, achieve unanimity. It was
Frankfurter who framed the questions that were the predicate of the 1953
reargument, 8 who contrived to bifurcate liability and remedy, and who
contributed "all deliberate speed." In retrospect, it is easy to say that
Frankfurter should have known that "all deliberate speed" would invite
southern foot-dragging and, then, bitter-end resistance. But, as Simon
points out, what Frankfurter was institutionally entitled to expect-a
strong voice from the White House supportive of the Court-was not
forthcoming. "The times demanded the presidential leadership of a Lin-
coln or an Andrew Jackson, Frankfurter observed privately, and regretta-
bly Dwight Eisenhower had neither the will nor the vision to meet the
challenge." '
III. CONCLUSION
Simon's book is partly about law made by the Supreme Court. It is
partly about friendship on that Court. And it is also about colleagueship
among members of the Court: a structure for, and process of, working
together that is indispensable to the proper functioning of that Court or,
indeed, any appellate tribunal that takes its work seriously.
After Frankfurter, partly disabled by a stroke in 1962, retired from the
Court, Black wrote him that "We're going to miss you on the Court be-
cause we need you," adding that "when some of my friends say to me,
46. H. BLACK, JR., supra note 5, at 208.
47. Coleman, Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Civil Libertarian as Lauryer and Justice: Extent to Which
Judicial Responsibilities Affected His Pre-Court Convictions, in Six JUSTICES ON CiVIL RIGHTS 85,
102 (R. Rotunda ed. 1983). Coleman was Frankfurter's law clerk in the 1948 Term.
48. Frankfurter's strong right arm in this aspect of the endeavor was his law clerk, Alexander M.




'things will be easier on the Court now,' I tell them they couldn't be more
wrong." 50
This story complements an anecdote that Anthony Lewis tells in
Gideon's Trumpet, the splendid book which traces the background of
Gideon v. Wainwright.51 Gideon was the 1963 decision requiring, as an
ingredient of Fourteenth Amendment due process, that states see to it that
all felony defendants have counsel. Gideon overruled Betts v. Brady,52 a
1942 decision in which the majority, in a Roberts opinion joined by
Frankfurter, held that counsel need be appointed only when there was a
showing of "special circumstances" establishing the inability of the de-
fendant adequately to represent himself. Black had written a masterful
dissent in Betts v. Brady. And the Betts v. Brady rule proved unworkable,
because there are almost always "special circumstances." Twenty-one
years later it fell to Black to write the Court's opinion in Gideon, writing
into the Constitution his earlier dissent. Lewis reports the following:
Gideon v. Wainwright was a triumph for Hugo Black, but in a way
the case suggests that there was not always so deep a gulf between
his view of the law and Felix Frankfurter's as the occasional ferocity
of their well-known debate suggested.
Shortly after the Gideon case was decided, Justice Black visited
Justice Frankfurter at home and told his ailing colleague about the
conference at which the case had been discussed. He had told the
other members of the Court, Justice Black said, that if Felix had
been there he would have voted-faithful to his own view of due
process-to reverse the conviction of Clarence Earl Gideon and over-
rule Betts v. Brady.-justice Frankfurter said: "Of course I would."'53
Simon's book closes with the following paragraph:
During the Court's winter break in February 1965, Hugo and Eliz-
abeth Black [the Justice's second wife]54 visited Hugo Black, Jr., and
his family in Miami. Afterward, Justice Black and his wife began
the drive north toward Washington, D.C., stopping for breakfast in
St. Augustine, Florida. At the breakfast table Hugo opened the
morning's newspaper and gasped at the headline: "Ohhh, Felix is
dead!" And then he wept.
55
50. P. 258 (quoting from Hugo Black papers, Library of Congress).
51. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
52. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
53. A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 220-22 (1964).
54. See supra note 26.
55. P. 260 (quoting from H. BLACK, JR. & E. BLACK, supra note 5, at 102).
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